


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# Christian Order

## Summary of Contents for February 1972

AFTER THE SYNOD

*The Editor*

CLASS DISTINCTION  
IN RUSSIAN EDUCATION

*S. S. Voronitsyn*

SOVIET BLUEPRINT FOR AFRICA

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THE SCOTTISH NHS

*J. M. Jackson*

READINGS AT MASS

*Francis Fenn, S.J.*

NIXON'S VISIT TO CHINA

*E. L. Way*

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## *Thank You*

The response of those whose subscriptions were due in December has been magnificent. I would like to thank those who have renewed their subscriptions so promptly. Might I take the opportunity of asking those who have not yet renewed to be so kind as to do so without delay? I would be saved much work thereby.

There are still a very few readers who received reminders that their renewals of subscriptions were due in December and January and who have not yet sent them in. The Editor would be most grateful if they would do so. The address is: 65, Belgrave Road, London, S.W.1.

My very deep thanks to all readers for their unfailing support so generously given throughout the past year. I wish you every possible blessing during the coming twelve months.

Very gratefully yours,  
Paul Crane, S.J.

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**CHRISTIAN ORDER** is a monthly magazine devoted to the promulgation of Catholic Social Teaching and incisive comment on current affairs in Church and State; at home and abroad; in the political, social and industrial fields.

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Please let us know two or three weeks ahead if possible and please send us both new and old addresses. Thank you.

# Christian Order

EDITED BY

Paul Crane SJ

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VOLUME 13

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## Out of the Frying Pan

THE EDITOR

A RATHER dangerous type of over-reaction seems to be afflicting some of South America's bishops at the present time. This is understandable, though it could prove unfortunate to the point of tragedy. The Church on that continent is emerging from a long period of what might be described with fairness and, indeed, understanding, as acquiescence in a status quo devoid of any pronounced sense of social justice. Now, as so often happens under such circumstances, certain bishops and clerics have leapt way ahead of their fellows and come out with pronouncements on contemporary discontents, which it would be something of an understatement to describe as based on a superficial analysis of South America's social problems. The situation is a little ironical. For years, Latin America has suffered from the silence of a hierarchy in bondage to an unjust status quo. In future, it may suffer more from the adoption of *simplicite* policies recommended nowadays by bishops over-eager to remove the Church from the last vestiges of guilt by association, as they see it, with the injustices of the past.



Examples are not difficult to find. What is one to make, for example, of the recent statement of Bishop Jesus Lopez da Lama of Bolivia that antiquated structures of inequality "must be replaced by a new order which serves all men and which respects their dignity as children of God". As an aspiration this is admirably in accord with the Gospel. As a positive statement of policy, it would appear to imply that equality can be removed without delay through a redistribution of incomes and, further, that state power should be the instrument of that redistribution. I trust I am not reading too much into the Bishop's words. I doubt it, for he had said earlier on in the same speech that Christians must initiate a process of "profound, urgent and revolutionary change" and that "Christians committed to truth and love must be subversive when faced with unjust orders, and they must be revolutionaries against the structures of oppression". As reported, these words of Bishop da Lama appear to add up to a plea for revolutionary, socio-political action in aid of instant Utopia. With respect, one is entitled to ask him whether he realises that the end of the road he advocates or appears to advocate is a totalitarian People's State. The fulfilment of his policy would bring no more than an exchange of servitudes — the casual ruthlessness of monopoly capitalism, for the conscious ruthlessness of the totalitarian State.

Again, take two recommendations of Bishop Ariztia Ruiz, Auxiliary of Santiago de Chile, who recently visited Cuba with Bishop Gonzalez Cruchaga of Talca to see how that country's Catholics were getting along under the Castro regime. "First", he said, "Christians must join the revolutionary process, giving their best to building a new society, instead of remaining outside with negative criticism. . . . Secondly, Christians must soon come to the mature realization that their Faith calls above all for involvement in their neighbour's needs".

There is here in the first recommendation, I would

suggest with respect, an almost total failure to realise that, if Christians join any revolution under Marxist aegis, the net result can only be that they are discarded — reduced to the status of second-class citizens confined to a ghetto — if and when the revolution has succeeded in consolidating its power. This has been the story of every Communist take-over everywhere since Lenin began the modern story in Russia in 1917. What makes Bishop Ariztia think the story will be any different in Chile or anywhere else? Why did he not see — I find this startling — that it had, in fact, been the story in Cuba itself? It is, I fear, naive and muddled thinking at its worst for the Bishop to imagine that practising Catholics in Cuba have been turned by Castro into a helot class (as is, in fact, the case, and as he himself observed) *because* (in Bishop Ariztia's opinion) the Church in Cuba opposed Castro's revolution. Whether she opposed it or favoured it, joined it or not, Catholics in Cuba (or anywhere else) would have been excluded from the fruits of Communist revolution, for the very simple reason that Catholicism and Communism are in essence incompatible, as no one recognises better than the Communist himself. Catholics do not; neither, nowadays, are they encouraged to do so. As a result of their failure in this regard — because issues have been blurred by a bogus ecumenism and a naive misunderstanding of the requirements of dialogue — there has been placed under Communist direction in most developing countries what should have been a strong Christian movement in the direction of rightful social reform. It is a tragedy that Bishop Ariztia has failed apparently to recognise this; a failure made manifest in his second recommendation that Christians should become involved in their neighbours' needs. As it stands in its South American and, particularly, Chilean context, this second recommendation—put broadly and in such unqualified fashion—is the kind of thing Latin American Marxists pray for. Its ultimate effect, if put into successful practice, could only be to place a whole Catholic people in bondage. No one, I am sure, wants this less

than Bishop Ariztia. With very great respect I would suggest that he give concentrated study to the implications of his words.

Other examples could be cited. Those given suffice, I hope, to make my point. It would be tragic if, at its moment of first awakening in Latin America, Christian radicalism were made, however unwittingly, the instrument of Communist power. The tragedy can be avoided only to the extent that Catholics in Latin America rest their reforming effort on a firm basis of true Christian principle and apply it strategically to the problems that beset them. There is too much unthinking talk amongst Catholics in South America today and far too little intelligent action. Unless the balance is redressed in favour of the latter, the Bishops will find, I fear, that the net effect of their advocacy is to take their people not merely out of the frying pan, but rapidly into the fire.

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### To make a New World

Christ came to make a new world. He came into the world to regenerate it in Himself, to make a new beginning, to be the beginning of the creation of God, to gather together in one, and recapitulate all things in Himself . . . The world was like some fair mirror, broken in pieces, and giving back no one uniform image of its Maker. But He came to combine what was dissipated, to recast what was shattered in Himself. He began all excellence, and of His fulness have all we received (from *Sermon bearing on Subjects of the Day*, 61, Newman).



In the following article, Mr. Voronitsyn shows that, in the U.S.S.R., a privileged class is securing a major share of the benefits of higher education. Reprinted by courtesy of our Australian contemporary, "Social Survey."

## Class Distinction in Russian Education

S. S. VORONITSYN

AT the beginning of the new academic year, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* published a lengthy article by A. V. Darinsky, a corresponding member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the USSR, dealing with the growing discrepancy between the number of young people finishing secondary school and the number who have the opportunity of receiving higher education. According to Darinsky, some two-and-a-quarter million pupils are released each year by the secondary day schools and a further 700,000-800,000 complete their secondary education at evening classes and so-called "shift schools" or through correspondence courses, giving a total of about three million, for whom no more than 500,000 full-time study places at higher educational institutions are available. This means that only two out of nine pupils proceeding from day schools and only one out of six of all those completing secondary school in the USSR can be accepted by the day departments of higher educational institutions. Moreover, these figures still do not include the more than 900,000 finishing technical schools, many of whom also want to receive a higher education, nor those who for some reason did not enter university in the preceding years. In short, the absolute



majority of those completing even day school cannot count on a place at a higher educational institution, whether on day, evening or correspondence courses.

### *Reserved Places*

Darinsky, moreover, does not mention the fact that a considerable number of university places are reserved for demobilized servicemen, for persons sent by various factories and organizations, and for those who have spent more than two years doing productive work.

The first signs of a serious discrepancy between the number of pupils leaving secondary school and that of places available at higher educational institutions began to appear in the middle fifties, when the secondary-school "years" delayed by the war and the ensuing chaos began to be released. In 1951, for example, there were 245,200 places available for 339,900 secondary-school leavers, but by 1954 the respective figures were 276,200 and 1,013,600. In subsequent years, the disproportion increased further, and in 1958, no fewer than 1,573,000 secondary-school leavers were competing for 215,500 places.

The present situation is that, although since 1951 the number of places available for full-time day study at higher educational institutions has doubled, the number of secondary-school graduates has risen by 650 per cent. As the Minister of Higher and Secondary Special Education of the USSR, V. P. Yelyutin, has confirmed, there is little hope of improvement during the next few years. Indeed, since secondary education has been made compulsory, the number of secondary-school pupils is bound to rise. *Literaturnaya Gazeta* writes: "As the resolution of the Twenty-Third Party Congress on universal secondary education for youth is put into practice, the discrepancy between the output of the secondary schools and the intake of the higher educational institutions will grow and, consequently, the chances of entry to such an institution will diminish further. In the next few years, nearly nine out of ten secondary-school leavers will have to start working

for the national economy immediately after finishing the tenth grade”.

### *Unrest*

This development will clearly bring social problems in its wake. There is certain to be widespread disillusionment among secondary-school leavers who fail to enter a higher educational institution and who, lacking professional qualifications, are forced to accept unskilled employment. Opinion polls conducted over several years in many parts of the Soviet Union reveal that most young people leaving school are interested in professions which require high qualifications and can only be reached via higher educational institutions. Surveys conducted in Leningrad and the Leningrad Oblast, for example, show that the most attractive professions for young people are those of physicist, radio engineer, medical researcher, geologist, mathematician, chemist, biologist, pilot, etc., while the least desirable occupations are those of turner, milling machine operator, shop salesman, book-keeper, house painter, printer, agricultural worker, etc. This is doubtless due to the fact that, in the USSR, scientists and technologists enjoy an obvious degree of prestige and considerable material benefits. For the children of industrial and collective farm workers, the acquisition of high professional qualifications is a guarantee of social advancement, while for the children of the intelligentsia, it ensures that they will be able to retain the privileges which they already enjoy by virtue of their parents' social position.

### *Failure*

It is therefore not surprising that many secondary-school leavers who fail to secure admission to a higher educational institution regard this as the end of all their personal plans and hopes. As observed in a letter of complaint from a Leningrad factory director to the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences: “If a secondary-school leaver fails to pass the

examination for entrance into a place of higher education, he goes into a factory, but he regards this as a temporary solution, as a failure; he shows no effort or interest in the work and at the earliest opportunity tries to leave".

This mass of discontented young people in the USSR is growing year by year. Aware of the social and economic implications of the problem, Soviet specialists recommend that vocational training and psychological preparation for the world of labor be intensified in general secondary schools. (In Khrushchev's day, it will be remembered, the attempt to give senior pupils on-the-job training in factories failed. The overall educational level of these pupils fell, but their desire to secure a higher education remained undiminished; if they failed and had to go out to work, it was usually not in a specialty they had studied at school.)

The educational authorities are now trying to interest school children in the less attractive trades. V. M. Khvostov, President of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, explained: "We still require a system of active measures aimed at shaping the inclinations and interests of pupils and instilling into them an attitude to their personal future which shall correspond to the real needs and opportunities of our society. In the main, this system must be worked out by pedagogical science in collaboration with psychologists and other specialists". The response in the Soviet press suggests that attempts to dissuade parents from sending their children to higher educational institutions have misfired. *Pravda* correspondent V. Chachin, for example, commented: "If you ask such a parent, 'Why does your child *have* to go to an institute?' he becomes offended and excited. 'All my life I've stood at a machine tuning a handle. I was in the trenches. From the Volga to Berlin, you know. . . . Don't I deserve that my child should? . . . The institute means a profession for life . . . and I'm going to send my son to an institute'".

At the core of the educational problem in the Soviet Union lies the influence of social origin on the whole of

a young person's future career. The children of the more privileged social groups have a far better chance of realizing their ambitions than their less fortunate classmates — i.e., the privileges of the parents are passed on to the children. This inequality begins in the nursery schools and reaches its peak when it comes to admission to an institution of higher education. Sociologist V. N. Shubkin drew attention to this problem several years ago : "Now, for example, the social composition of secondary-school leavers and first-year students differs sharply from the social composition of children in the first grade. Whereas in the first grade, the children of workers and peasants predominate, on the first-year courses at an institute, the children of intellectuals and white-collar workers are in the majority. This is a very complex problem and it cannot be solved in one or two years. But if we want to solve it, then we have no right to ignore these facts".

### *Leaving School*

On completing the eighth or ninth grade, school children have their first opportunity of leaving school. Here, an automatic process of social selection takes place in that many of those from less privileged families have to go out to work either because their wages are needed to supplement the family income or because the ten-year school is too far away from their homes. A survey among pupils in the eighth grades of schools in Nizhny Tagil revealed that 54.6 per cent of the boys and 78.3 per cent of the girls from professional families and only 27.7 per cent of the boys and 47.6 per cent of the girls from workers' families were going on to the ninth grade. More recently, this sifting has been tending to occur in the ninth and tenth grades, since, in order to fulfil the plan for the transition to universal secondary education, school authorities have been trying to persuade eighth graders to go on to the ninth grade. It is only natural, however, that, having got thus far, the majority of pupils, irrespective of family background, want to carry on with their education. Thus,



in Novosibirsk and the Novosibirsk Oblast, 93 per cent of the children of "urban intellectuals", 76 per cent of those of "rural intellectuals", 83 per cent of working class children and 76 per cent of agricultural workers' children expressed a desire to enter a higher educational institution. Similar figures were recorded among final-year secondary school pupils in Leningrad, Ufa, Sverdlovsk and elsewhere.

### *Wealth and Influence*

In various ways, the odds are heavily in favour of the children of wealthier and more influential parents. Although, in theory, all are equal in the competitive entrance examinations, admission to a higher educational institution often depends not on intelligence alone, but also on a number of social prerequisites that are largely possessed by certain social groups. The results of entrance examinations prove that the best chances are enjoyed by the children of wealthier parents of higher social and cultural standing, particularly of those living in the larger cities. As a rule, the standard of tuition in urban schools is higher than in rural ones, which again is a built-in advantage for certain sections of the population. This was admitted by the Rector of Moscow University, I. G. Petrovsky: "... entrance to Moscow University is not easy, especially for young people from rural areas. This is not because village children are less gifted. Talented people are born in equal measure both in the capital and in the remote villages. We well appreciate that in country schools the standard of instruction is lower. Moreover, in the cities many children frequently make use of the services of private coaches". Private coaching is becoming increasingly popular, but it is obviously only within the reach of the children of more affluent parents. The value of this extra tuition is beyond doubt: in 1969, no less than 85 per cent of first-year students at the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics of Moscow University had received additional coaching prior to the entrance examination. This prompted the following comment from *Komsomolskaya Pravda*:

"With the approach of summer, many teachers at higher educational institutions display feverish activity. They rush to rent apartments as near to a subway station as possible—a telephone is also obligatory—display advertisements in the busiest places and try to outdo their rivals with impressive-sounding (and frequently non-existent) titles. For the duration of the coaching 'boom', some even give up their summer holidays, and in some cases they band together and form associations". They have worked out a scale of payments for their services: the average fee is 5 rubles an hour, but the children of well-to-do parents pay more.

### *Success*

For appropriate remuneration, some of these part-time private tutors are prepared, on the basis of their connections, to guarantee success in the entrance examinations. "Some fond fathers and mothers", it was commented in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, "will go to any lengths to obtain a 'guarantee' that their son or daughter will be accepted. Behind the closed doors of secluded houses, countless meeting and 'confidential' negotiations take place."

The official position and influence of parents, relatives and friends also play a large and frequently decisive role. They literally lay siege to the examination and enrolment commissions and take them by storm. If this assault is repulsed, the telephone calls begin. At first the fathers and mothers, the grandfathers and grandmothers telephone, then the "influential", "venerable", "responsible" and "nomenclature" contacts are brought in. They request that "particular attention" be paid to a certain candidate who did not get top marks in the school-leaving examination, or that his "case be reconsidered".

### *Social Imbalance*

These and many other legal, semi-legal and illegal devices do much to create a social imbalance among students accepted by higher educational institutions in the

Soviet Union. In Leningrad and the Leningrad Oblast, for example, 73 per cent of the children of intellectuals and only 50 per cent of industrial workers' and 35 per cent of agricultural workers' children secure daytime places at the universities and technical colleges. At the beginning of 1966, 57.7 per cent of the students at Rostov University were the sons and daughters of white-collar workers, 38 per cent were from industrial workers' families, while only 4.3 per cent were the offspring of collective farm workers. In 1969, 52 per cent of students at higher educational institutions in the Sverdlovsk Oblast were white-collar workers or the children of white-collar workers, the percentages for industrial and collective farm workers being 44.3 and 3.5. Throughout the entire Soviet Union, the proportion of intellectuals and their children attending day courses at higher educational institutions rose from 41.1 per cent in 1965 to 45 per cent in 1968, while that of persons with a collective-farm background dropped from 19.5 to 16 per cent. Collective-farm workers and their families, however, comprise about 25 per cent of the total Soviet population and the intelligentsia little more than 20 per cent.

In late 1969, by a decree of the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, special departments were established at many higher educational institutions to prepare "advanced" workers, collective farmers and demobilized servicemen for direct entrance without examination. Since candidates are selected primarily on the basis of Party and Komsomol recommendations, however, this scheme is not only hardly likely to redress the social imbalance in higher education but will probably strengthen the representation of ideologically orthodox youth among students and young specialists. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* wrote that, last year, the preparatory departments at many higher educational institutions were filled up in an unjustifiably casual manner; nobody was interested in the knowledge and ability of the applicants. The results soon became apparent. In some higher educational institutions, more than half the students

are having difficulty in coping with the program of study.

It will have become clear that in the sphere of higher education, the Party Leaders in the Soviet Union are confronted with problems somewhat reminiscent of those facing politicians in capitalist countries that have reached a comparable stage of economic development: the questions of the "overproduction" of intellectuals, and the progressive self-isolation of what has come to be known in the West as the "establishment".

On the former question, it may be said that in the Soviet world such an "overproduction" of — possibly unruly — intellectuals is particularly dangerous, since according to the Russian revolutionary tradition the "intelligentsia", the more highly educated stratum of society, has a highly-developed class consciousness of its own. As a result, unemployment in this stratum, which in the non-communist world is mainly a source of purely personal difficulties, in Russia, rapidly becomes a social and hence also a political problem.

As to the second, we have seen that despite the creation of "preparatory" faculties or departments, opportunities for receiving a higher education remain largely a privilege confined to children of the present ruling stratum: making use of its advantages, the new Soviet intelligentsia has found a way of handing on its social privileges to its children and so turning itself into a self-perpetuating hereditary élite. And here it may be commented that whereas in the West the existence of exclusive élites and the "overproduction" of highly-educated specialists is a purely practical phenomenon, in communist countries, it is also of some importance as a matter of principle; it is the purpose of a communist dictatorship, based on the abolition of private property, to destroy existing élites and prevent their future re-emergence; and the fact that such élites, exclusive and self-perpetuating, do emerge and persist under a communist regime calls into question the very *raison d'être* of such a regime.



This frightening picture of present Soviet intention with regard to Africa is not made up. It rests on an analysis of Soviet design with regard to that Continent published last year by the present Director of the Africa Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. It should cause the peoples of Africa and their true friends elsewhere intense concern.

# Soviet Blueprint for Africa: New Edition

CZESLAW JESMAN

LAST year, a book appeared in Moscow under a somewhat long-winded title; *Africa Chooses its Way: Social and Economic Perspectives*. It caused little stir in the Soviet Union, appearing in a ridiculously small edition of five thousand copies and well-nigh unobtainable, in consequence, by the ordinary reader in the Soviet Union or, for that matter, the West.

## *An Open Directive*

The book was meant, of course, to serve as an open directive for non-clandestine Soviet operatives in Africa itself and elsewhere. On this count alone it deserves very close attention. All the more so in view of the fact that it was written by V. G. Solodovnikov, corresponding-member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and Director of its Africa Institute. (It is worth noting that "corresponding-member" is the second highest title any individual can possess in this particular field of Soviet public life.) The book, moreover, was published under the auspices of the Principal Editorial Board of Eastern

Literature of the *Nauka* — i.e., Science — Publishing House.

These details are highly relevant. The Soviet Union like every other Communist secularist State is profoundly hierarchical. Such small straws in the winds as the order of line-up of dignitaries in a reviewing stand, the arrangement of their pictures in the Press and so on, are of infinitely more significance in the Soviet Union than analogous happenings elsewhere in the non-Communist world. In the Soviet Union or, for that matter, Communist China, they are seen, under normal circumstances, as outward signs of inner jockeying for power; on rarer occasions, as grim portents of major upheavals. Thus, a book of the kind considered here — given its author and the trimmings that surround its publication — is invested at once with special significance: it represents, in fact, no more and no less than the plan of Moscow's long-term and overt African policy. Before it passed into print under Solodovnikov's signature the book, without doubt, will have had to undergo security and suitability tests of a very searching nature. All the more so in view of the shambles that was made of previous Soviet policy with regard to Africa. Under Krushchev, the first Soviet drive into Africa ended in a series of flops, some of them horrible and gruesome to a degree, like the prolonged mutiny-cum-rebellion in Zaire — the former Belgian Congo — with its attendant massacres and the horrible end of Patrice Lumumba, posthumously promoted to full membership of the Soviet Communist Party. Light relief to these tragic events was provided by such *faux pas* as the arrival at Kampala of a consignment of snow ploughs and the despatch from the Soviet Union of discarded winter clothing to Ghana, to say nothing of the undignified behaviour of certain Soviet diplomats in various African capitals.

### *New Soviet Strategy*

The wind of change was far from spent in Africa when the Soviet leaders realised that they had lost the

first round in the struggle. Round about this time, too, the late Nikita Krushchev was toppled from power and his faithful head Africanist died. This was Professor I. I. Potekhin, a K.G.B. (secret police) Colonel from Siberia, who had been promoted to the status of expert on ethnography and made Director of the Africa Institute. Potekhin died of a lingering paralysis, which, it was alleged, he caught in Ghana. Other one-time powerful friends of the Soviet Union, like Kwame Nkrumah and Ben Bella — one of its honorary Heroes — were disappearing from the stage at about the same time. Soviet power in Africa was temporarily on the wane; which meant that the way was open to China's attempt at penetration. Mao's men began to bob up in Africa again, in spite of previous initial set-backs. This time, they scored some notable successes, like the bridge-heads secured in Tanzania, Somalia and Mauretania. Between 1966 and 1968 direct Soviet involvement in African affairs was practically non-existent. For Russia, the period was one of gestation and rethinking African policy and problems. Solodovnikov's book has to be seen both as the first, overt fruit of this period of rethink and as an announcement of the Soviet strategy that is now to be applied to the African Continent. Its importance lies here.

The main interest of Solodovnikov's publication is to be found in comparing it with a book by Potekhin which appeared ten years ago and which was entitled *Africa Looks into the Future*. In this work the now defunct KGB Colonel quoted Lenin abundantly: it was clear nevertheless that neither master nor disciple really knew anything about the subject. All the same, Potekhin persisted in the opinion that the Africans were pining for Marxist doctrine, for the unity of their Continent, for friendship with the Soviet Union and that they abhorred western capitalism above everything else. Solodovnikov is far more subtle. He says that the main element in the political development amongst Africans as it stands at the moment, is to be found in a struggle between the

supporters of "capitalist solutions" for their countries' problems and those who follow Marxist doctrines. The road taken by African development depends, therefore and in the first place, on the outcome of an ideological confrontation between Africans themselves. In this respect, Solodovnikov makes no secret in his book that both currents of thought in Africa are very strong. He does not believe that there is an African road to Socialism any more than he believes that there is a kind of third road or way for the Continent of Africa as a whole. He dismisses as "ideological phantasmagorias" all and any thoughts there may be about the peaceful and unified coexistence of different African States within some all-African, inter-state organization. For Solodovnikov's predecessor, Potekhin, all indigenous Africans — except for the Boers and those Whites who chose to throw in their lot with the erstwhile colonies — were good and all Whites in Africa or out of it, provided they had any previous links with it, were bad. Solodovnikov, in his book, dismisses such ideas as so much hot air. By the same token, he implies his scant regard for the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which he regards mainly as a gimmick devised by African "Capitalists" to outmanoeuvre African "Socialists". Its main use, for him, is that it serves a useful function — more so, too, its subsidiaries in Dar-es-Salaam — as a weapon to be used against white-dominated Africa south of the Kalahari.

### *Guidelines for a Takeover*

Solodovnikov says with becoming modesty that his book is not exclusively an academic effort (He can say that again!). It is, in reality, a set of guidelines as to how the African Continent is to be taken over when opportunity offers in the future, and what is to be done, meanwhile, to keep the fires well stoked against the day — whom to subsidise, for example, and whom not to; how, why and when. Solodovnikov's book, therefore, is anything but an exercise in theoretical speculation. One learns this from



reading it and one learns it also from Soviet practice in the wake of its publication: in two areas of Africa, the Master's advice is now being followed. Take Tanzania: since President Obote was driven out of Uganda and forced to take refuge in Tanzania, there has been enmity between the two countries—breaking out in border friction—on this score. Now Tanzania is a great friend of the Third World, particularly if it happens to veer Left of Centre, and the deposed President of Uganda was undoubtedly pro-Soviet and much favoured by the Soviet Union when in power. Despite these two facts, Moscow has had no hesitation at all in maintaining excellent relations with General Amin, Uganda's present President, who deposed Obote. Similarly, in the Sudan not many months ago, a Communist coup was quashed by a counter-coup, Sudanese friends and protégés of the Soviet Union shot and Soviet advisers bundled unceremoniously out of the country. Despite these incidents and bar some shouting from Moscow at the time, not a ripple of disapproval from Moscow appears to disturb relations between the two countries as they are now in the wake of the trouble just described.

The thing to note is that this type of Soviet reaction is both coherent and justified in the light of Solodovnikov's book. Whether on account of Chinese pressure in both the Sudan and Tanzania, or because the Suez Canal remains blocked, or because the Soviet Union has bigger fish to fry elsewhere, a pragmatic and cold-blooded approach—as distinct from one that is ideologically motivated at the expense of all else—is what one would expect now from the Soviet Union in the light of Solodovnikov's book. So far, this is exactly what has occurred—a pragmatic Soviet approach to messy situations until a change supervenes to demand a shift of policy to Soviet advantage.

Solodovnikov's book does not provide the Soviet Union with its only guide-lines for Africa. Even more interesting is V. B. Yordanski's *Dead Ends and Perspectives of Tropical*

*Africa*. Like Solodovnikov's effort, it, too, was published by the Nauka Publishing House in 1970. It is twice as bulky. Solodovnikov's work runs to two hundred and thirty-eight pages; Yordanski's book takes up four hundred and seventy-four. These carry an analysis of Africa in terms of "The World of Communities", "Chiefs and the Common People", "Disintegration of the Peasantry", "New Towns", "Tradesmen and Businessmen", "Strength and Weakness of the Proletariat", "Officials, Politicians and the *Intelligentsia*", "Town Slums", "Social History of Tribalism", "The Deadweight of Colonialism", "Parties, Power and Tribal Structure" and several other specialised subjects. Yordanski's study is head and shoulders above the usual run of Soviet — and other — pot-boilers on Africa. Marxist jargon is limited to a strict minimum throughout and some of the book's conclusions are lucid and to the point. He writes, for example, that "There exists in Tropical Africa a sharp imbalance between the external calm of village existence and its inner tensions". This is sound. Meanwhile, of course, religion, missionaries, animism and magic are, as they would be in any Soviet publication on the subject, bundled together and summarily dismissed. All this and much else in Yordanski's book reveals an attitude very different from that which typified the Soviet attitude to Africa only a decade ago.

### *Soviet Russia's Other Face*

This time—in publications such as those by Solodovnikov and Yordanski — the Soviet Union is finding it expedient to show its other face towards Africa. The face is that of a well-informed, calculating and ruthless operator bent on the eventual conquest of a congeries of weak, muddle-headed and thoroughly disorientated African countries. At this stage, the Soviet Union, in these two books, is telling the countries of Africa — and the rest of the world — exactly what it intends to do. The reader, no doubt, will find this very hard to believe. The reader should think again and he will find the present, overt Soviet publication of

their intentions towards Africa perfectly easy to understand. Let him realise, please, that to divulge one's innermost plans to a prospective victim is a very sound method of psychological warfare; for, the revelation either makes the revealer preposterous in the eyes of his prospective victim and, therefore, incredible, so that eventual take-over is easy; or it makes him awe-inspiring in his deadliness and only too credible, so that surrender becomes inevitable. Let it be remembered that Hitler's revelation of himself and his intentions in *Mein Kampf* made such an impact on the nations of Europe that it very nearly tipped the scales in favour of complete victory for the Third Reich at the outset of the Second World War. Something very similar, in the case of the Soviet Union, is now taking place in Africa. Chinese competition or no Chinese competition, Moscow is publishing its intention, which adds up to the undeviating pursuit of its policy of conquest of the entire African Continent. This time, however, there is no false bonhomie to hide its true intention, no pretence in the sweltering heat of Dar-es-Salaam, for example, that the Russians are just honest brokers between the Old and the New, continuing the task laid down by others, of carrying the White Man's Burden, true friends of the Black Man in the best traditions of the French Revolution of nearly two centuries ago.

So far as Africa is concerned, it would seem that the era of super and middle Powers rushing into that continent with subsidies and scholarships, vieing with each other for special treatment and concessions from the governments of newly independent countries, is over. We are on the verge of a harsh and relentless period which will see ruthless attempts by Moscow to subvert and destroy the weaker of Africa's newly independent countries with a view to suborning them. As Solodovnikov himself has said, the problem now for the Soviet Union is whether or not Africa can withstand this second assault, so much more imaginative and better thought out in every way than the first.

# Readings at Mass

FRANCIS FENN, S.J.

**S**T. PAUL'S first letter to the Corinthians is continued on the first two Sundays of February. The axiom of 1,25 ("The foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men") is illustrated in Paul's method of preaching. His success at Corinth was due to the Holy Spirit and not to his own eloquence or to philosophical reasoning. But, he goes on, he does have a wisdom to offer those who are capable of receiving it—the wisdom of Christ.

The Sermon on the Mount is continued in the readings from St. Matthew's gospel. The first contains no difficulties, if we remember that we are the light of the world and the salt of the earth because we have been baptised "into Christ". By living according to his teaching, we shall bear witness to the goodness of our Father in heaven.

The gospel on the following Sunday consists of twenty-six verses. You may hear a shortened version; but we should briefly consider the whole passage. It has to do with what is a somewhat complex question: the attitude of our Lord and of the first Christians to the Law of the Old Testament, of which St. Paul has much to say in Romans and Galatians. He had to oppose the view that a pagan must first become a Jew before he became a Christian, whereas Matthew is writing for a community of Jewish Christians among whom the Sabbath was still observed (cf. 12,1-14).

For the Pharisees the Law was the complete and final revelation of God. To protect the perfect observance of the Law they "built a fence" around the Law; the fence consisted of legal opinions which advanced the obligations of the Law beyond the sense of the words, and thus made it more difficult to violate. This was the "oral law"



(called in the New Testament "human tradition") and together with this the Law was reckoned to include 613 distinct commandments, in the literal observance of which righteousness consisted. <sup>(1)</sup>

Clearly our Lord had to oppose this view. Those who place their confidence in the Law make an obstacle of it: of itself it is an insufficient means of reaching God; it must be "fulfilled", reach its fullness, in Jesus. Submission to the will of God goes beyond the observance of the Law, as is illustrated in the six examples given in this chapter — murder, adultery, divorce, oaths, revenge, love of enemies (the first four are included in to-day's gospel). It is the principle here that is important: men's hearts are to be open to the demands of God's love. "You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" are the closing words of the chapter.

Our Lord did not come to sweep away all law; he himself observed the Law, while questioning "human tradition". But repentant sinners are better than the unrepentant "righteous": as St. Paul was to say, "What makes a man righteous is not obedience to the Law, but faith in Jesus Christ" (Galatians 2, 15).

The story of the Fall in the book of Genesis, with which the readings for the first Sunday of Lent open, is the Hebrew answer to the questions: Why is mankind estranged from God? Why is sin so universal? It cannot be that man was created evil. But although there are many Old Testament texts which express an inclination to sin which is almost inborn, it was St. Paul (in to-day's second reading) who first stated clearly the doctrine of sinfulness transmitted from Adam: "Just as one man's disobedience made the mass of mankind sinners, so this one's (namely Christ's) obedience will make the mass of them upright." It is an amazing statement of human solidarity, the interest of which (to St. Paul) lies chiefly in the second part of the sentence. But if man had not fallen, we needed no redemption, nor were we really

(1) Cf. McKenzie: *Dictionary of the Bible*, art. Law.

redeemed by the death of Jesus Christ who is himself the new Adam.

People often wonder, when they hear to-day's gospel, whether the "temptation" of Jesus can be called a temptation at all. He was not liable to the common temptations of mankind; nor is he really subject, in the mind of the evangelist, to the temptation to abuse his power. This is the subject of the three temptations: to use his miraculous power to provide for ordinary material needs, to produce a spectacular display which would compel belief, and to carry out his mission by the use of political power. The episode describes the kind of Messiah Jesus was, and by implication what sort of society the Church which carries on his mission must be. It is here that Matthew's interest lies. Jesus rejects in anticipation the temptations to which his Church will be submitted. It does not carry out its mission by providing for basic physical necessities, but by proclaiming the word that is life. Our Lord's own feeding of the five thousand in John 6 leads up to (and is almost part of) the discourse on the bread of life. There must be a close connection between the Church's "welfare work" and its proclamation of the gospel. It must be a Church which lives by the word of God. It must not impose demands on God which God has not promised to fulfil. It must adore God alone, and not the world. Nor (as it has often done) must it use political means to carry out its purpose.

In the story of the Transfiguration (Lent 2) Moses and Elijah represent the Law and the Prophets — words used to cover the whole of the Old Testament, and thus the whole of God's revelation to Israel. Jesus (as in the Gospel two Sundays ago) "fulfils" the Law and the Prophets. He is the new Moses, carrying out the popular expectation (2) of a prophet who would come to found the new Israel. The three booths or tents which Peter wanted to put up are an allusion to the Feast of Tents which commemorated the stay of the Israelites round Mount

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(2) John 1, 21; 6, 14. See Deuteronomy 18, 15-18.

Sinai when they received the revelation of the Law through Moses. "His face shone like the sun" recalls the brightness of the face of Moses after the Sinai revelation (Exodus 34,29). The bright cloud is the Shekinah, the symbol of the presence of God. In a cloud God comes to declare the Law to Moses (Ex. 19,9; 24,15-16) and he speaks from the cloud as he does here. But here is a greater than Moses: "My beloved Son".

Jesus told the three disciples: "Tell no one the vision, until the Son of man is raised from the dead". The fullness of understanding the reality of Jesus was not possessed by the disciples until after the resurrection. The position of the Transfiguration here, after the first prediction of the Passion, reaffirms that Jesus is the Messiah. He is no less that when his glory is hidden.

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## State Power in the United States

"The services of Federal, state and local governments now account for between a fifth and a quarter of all economic activity. In 1929 it was about eight per cent. This far exceeds the government share in such an avowedly socialist state as India, considerably exceeds that in the anciently social democratic kingdoms of Sweden and Norway, and is not wholly incommensurate with the share in Poland, a communist country which, however, is heavily agricultural and which has left its agriculture in private ownership. A very large part (between one-third and one-half) of public activity is concerned with national defence and the exploration of space. This is not regarded even by conservatives as socialism. Elsewhere the nomenclature is less certain . . . Additionally . . . the state undertakes to regulate the total income available for the purchase of goods and services in the economy (from *The New Industrial State*, John Kenneth Galbraith).

## CURRENT COMMENT

Disenchanted comments of Catholic correspondents at the close of the Synod revealed a collective mentality that saw authority in the Church as residing in the People of God and its decisions as made by popular mandate. In comment on this mentality, Father Crane notes its contradictions and warns of its dangers.

# After the Synod

THE EDITOR

**N**OTHING became Catholic correspondents at the Synod less than their concluding comments on it. These were revealing to say the least. The collective mind portrayed was that of a group wedded to change for its own sake; petty in the tantrums displayed when change was not granted on the terms it desired; arrogant in its assumption that what it desired was identical with the hopes of clergy and faithful throughout the world — hopes that were dashed in the end, the correspondents would have us believe, by a clutch of reactionary and/or unrepresentative Churchmen, most especially the nineteen Cardinals of the Roman Curia and a further twenty-five Fathers who were at the Synod by special invitation of the Pope alone. In other words, the Synod, in the mind of the correspondents, was a fix. The voice of the People of God was stifled by a fiddle. The questions at issue remained, therefore, despite the adverse (in the eyes of the correspondents) voting. The decisions taken were, in fact, invalid because unrepresentative; this is the implication that appears to have underlain the disenchanted writing in final comment on the Synod. The assumption is sinister.

It is that authority in the Church derives not from God, but from the People of God: its decisions carry weight, therefore, only when representative of or ratified by the popular will. This is heresy. There is, naturally enough, no trace of it in the documents of the second Vatican Council in whose name these outrageous claims were made.

### *Synod not a Popular Assembly*

It is precisely because this wrong-headed theology was present in the minds of many correspondents at the Synod that they tended to regard it as a species of popular assembly whose decisions would be made by majority vote and draw their binding force from the majority that made them. This view is totally false and doctrine within the Church can never be made on its basis. Father James Tolhurst put the point very well in a letter to the *Universe* on November 19th, 1971:

"The result of the Synod was hardly good press material. However, this may have been because it *was* regarded as a 'parliament'. The inevitable connotations are that the bishops are M.P.'s and lobbies must be formed to ensure a good majority.

"In fact, the Synod is merely an expression of collegiality in which the magisterium (teaching authority of the Church) attempts to deepen its possession of the truth revealed by Christ.

"The college of bishops and the Pope who is their head and often their spokesman (cf. Acts 15/7) are not 'representing' anyone but Christ the high priest whose leadership and witness they assume by virtue of their office.

"It may be very democratic to talk of forums and parliaments, but the deposit of faith cannot be decided by a majority vote."

### *Hoisted with their own Petard*

There is, of course, no reason why the vote should not be used as an indication of opinion for reference to a



Bishop, a Conference of Bishops or, indeed, the Holy Father himself. It was so used at the Synod, but the Holy Father is not bound by it though, in his wisdom, he will indeed take count of it. He is not responsible to Parliament. This is so because his authority does not derive from the Synod or, indeed, the Church. It comes to him direct from God. The Synod Fathers showed their clear awareness of this by delivering to the Pope, at the end of the Synod, the documents on the priesthood and world justice for emendation, completion and publication as and when he saw fit. The decision, in other words, is the Pope's because supreme authority is his.

In fact, such voting as there was at the Synod went massively in favour of a celibate priesthood. Very naturally this infuriated the Progressives who wanted it made optional at the very least and whose low view of papal authority had brought them to Rome hoping to see the Holy Father "mandated" in this direction by massive majority vote. In fact, the voting on this question (which, as I have already explained above, was merely indicative and in no way binding, as Progressives chose to believe) went totally against the progressive position. Thus, they were hoisted with their own petard. Their reaction was typical. They took immediate steps to write down the value of the decision, attributing it to the presence of a reactionary and unrepresentative element within the ranks of the Synod Fathers. In other words, according to them, mandated decisions (of which, as we have seen, there can be none where Church Authority is concerned) are valid only when set in a progressive direction. This is the height of hypocrisy. It is, I am afraid, typical of the progressive outlook in all fields. Liberal democracy is splendid when it works in favour of liberals. If it does not, then you talk about "structures of violence" and use violent — i.e. non-democratic — means to destroy it in order to get your way. The rules, in other words, are fine so long as they work in your favour. If they don't, then change them; accuse those who make them of being unrepresentative

and so on. Thus the progressive correspondents at the Synod, whose hopes were dashed by its findings, and progressive participants like Cardinal Suenens. Immediately after the Synod, at a dinner given him by the corps of Spanish newsmen in Rome, he commented that "representation suffers because the vote of the Brazilians, with millions behind them, is the same as the vote of the Malta delegation". In other words, because the rules worked against Cardinal Suenens and his friends at the Synod, the first moves are being made to change them so that, in future, they work to the Cardinal's advantage. Grounds for the change are found in the unrepresentative nature of a selection that gives Brazil, with eighty million Catholics, the same representation as Malta, with three hundred and ten thousand. The Progressives, it would appear, are opting for representation at future Synods to rest on a basis of numerical equality. This, they feel, will work in their favour. I bet there would have been no complaints from them about lack of representation had the Synod gone their way.

### *Smear and Derision*

The Progressives, however, went further than this, as they usually do. In their anger at seeing their hopes dashed, they brought to their aid two other weapons whose combined effect was to discredit the Synod and, in consequence, its decisions. They made use of the smear, which is the lowest weapon of all, the ultimate, I think, in verbal nastiness. In this case, low motives were attributed by a leading Dutch Progressive to those whose views prevailed over his own at the Synod. They made use also of derision, branding a leading personality at the Synod as out of touch, implying thereby that his opinions were valueless.

In evidence of the smear, one need only take an address given by the Dutch Dominican, Father Edward Schillebeeckx, at the University of Liverpool Catholic Chaplaincy, as reported in the *Catholic Herald* for November 19th last

year. Many of the Bishops at the Synod, Father Schillebeeckx was reported as saying, were concerned not with human and Christian values, but with power. "Without the law of celibacy", he maintained, "they (the Bishops) would have less power." There could not be changes in the structure of the Church without changing the law of celibacy. Therefore, they refused to change the law of celibacy. This, I think, is a shocking attitude. It is not, I am afraid, the ultimate. For that we must look to Father René Laurentin, the French progressive priest, writing in *Le Figaro*. The weapon he employed was derision. This is what he said about the Cardinal Archbishop of Cologne, chosen specially by the Pope to present to the Synod an all-important paper on the priesthood, in which he came down heavily on the side of celibacy:

"On Saturday morning I positioned myself at the exit to see the triumphant hero of this third Synod; Cardinal Hoffner. It was easy because he came out on foot, alone and with no pomp, although he is in charge of one of the world's wealthiest dioceses.

The Archbishop of Cologne, who for a long time taught social doctrine, remains what he was before his election: a simple little professor, friendly, moderate in his deeds as in his smile. His strength lies entirely in his ability to fit everything into narrow categories, within which he cultivates a satisfied perfection.

"A majority of bishops, breathless at the present changes and giddy before the endless problems, found in him a sign of security. They liked above all his reassuring perspective, which wipes away the nightmares of 'new sociology' and 'permissive society'. For Cardinal Hoffner the height of dialogue is the university seminar directed by a competent professor. This is his model for the next Synod."

The contempt is thinly veiled. This is derision—mockery—used to perfection by one who is obviously adept at it. One can only say that the kind of writing in which

Abbé Laurentin indulges here is contemptible beyond words. One remembers a little of his history and one is not surprised. The technique used here is, of course, as old as the hills; the arrogance quite nauseating. The effect, thank God, cannot be lasting. The pretensions of the avid self-seeker stick out like so many sore thumbs from every word the Abbé writes in this passage. He will end up, as I wrote some years ago Charles Davis would end up, drowned in a sea of his own unlovely eloquence.

### *Illiberal Liberals*

An interesting and rather sad — indeed, disturbing — thing to note about the type of mentality represented by the Synod correspondents and, indeed, Catholic Progressives in general, is their seeming determination, despite set-backs, to thrust upon us all their desired reforms irrespective of the cost. This mentality has been very much in evidence since the close of the Second Vatican Council. It is time it was driven back into the hiding from which it emerged so shabbily in recent years. The mentality extends to all fields and it is in flagrant contradiction of the democratic ideal advocated so loudly and with such vulgarity by those in possession of it. Here, once again, we have the old story; liberalism is alright so long as it works to the advantage of Liberal Progressives: let it work against them and it becomes an instrument to be discarded. There is, for example, the matter of clerical dress in, say, developing or missionary countries. In many cases, progressive priests in African countries have abandoned overnight, as it were, their cassocks for a bush shirt and a pair of slacks. Sisters, in many cases, have done the equivalent. Now, the thing, I think, to remember is that the African people do not like this. Speak of this, however, to those concerned and they say, "We think this is the best thing to do". We are determined, in other words, to give the people what we think best for them whether they like it or not. Thus the progressive mind where its own innovating practices are concerned: all is

based on the premise that the Progressive knows better than the People of God what is good for the People of God. Knowing this, there need be and is no discussion. Nanny knows best. What is this if not the old paternalism, which Progressives affect to despise, in new and vulgar form? So, cassocks and habits and, in general, clerical dress are discarded, statues are pitched out of churches, the rosary relegated — all without discussion and all by unilateral imposition on the part of progressive priests and nuns, who are *constantly* calling for discussion within the Church and profess themselves outraged when its opportunity is denied them. What they really want, however, is not discussion, but the imposition of fast and further changes on a now long-suffering and patient Catholic people. Unable to secure all of these by single-handed fiat, as in the case of the discarding of clerical dress and the downgrading of the Blessed Sacrament, they are forced into attempts to secure what they want through discussion and dialogue, which they seek to pressurize into channels they consider desirable because leading to the realization of their progressive goals. Thus, they are all in favour now of democracy and majority rule, knowing that their best way forward is to manipulate both to secure what they really want, which is not the true interests of the Church, but the imposition on the Faithful of a whole host of their own pet ideas whether they are wanted or not. There are no true democrats, in the finest sense of the word, amongst the Catholic Progressives who clamour for democracy only when it suits their purposes to do so. All you have are little men in search of power, which they find in bending others to their will through the imposition on them of alien devotions and practices of their own devising. These are harsh words. History, I feel, will reveal them as true.

### *Hope for the Future*

No one is more illiberal than the Liberal Progressive in pursuit of his liberalism. He is by nature a destroyer.



What we have been feeling in the Church since the Council is the impact on us all of his inbred aptitude for destruction. By the Grace of God alone have we been spared its full effect. Evidence of the power of the Spirit in the Catholic Church today is not in the mass prophetic utterance that is said by some to have taken hold of it: this is mostly nonsense. It is to be found, rather, in the fact that the Church has not and, we know, will not crash in total confusion despite the all-out attack from within at present being made upon it. There lies the hope for the future. It is to be found nowhere and in nothing else.

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### *Correction*

In the January issue Henry Edwards wrote: "I see it, alas, in which the congregation is reading the Bible . . ." There follows in brackets a passage concerning "loud acclamations: as if the borrowing were not from the Byzantines where, for example, 'for thine is the power and the glory etc. is *not* said quietly by the priest.'" This should have read 'for thine is the power and the glory etc. is said quietly by the priest' (P. 35, last para.).

Henry Edwards apologises for the mistake, and excuses himself by pleading that he wrote the article in hospital where he has been a patient since last March. Readers will think of Henry Edwards in their prayers. Ed.

# Nixon's Visit to China

E. L. WAY

IN the Burbank studio where the *Laugh-In* show is taped, President Nixon announced in 90 seconds of television time, on the 15th of July last year, that he would go to Peking and meet Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai. His aim he said "is to seek the normalisation of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides". Swift and predictable were the reactions. Lord Caradon said it was "a turning point in world history"; and he was echoed by Joseph Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, who declared it "one of the great moments in the world's history". Equally predictable was the statement of the AFL-CIO president, George Meany, who ridiculed it as "the number-one stunt of the number-one stuntman of our time". He added that American support for China's admission to the U.N. was similar to Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938. The Japanese daily newspaper with the biggest circulation, the *Asahi Shimbun*, called the fixing of the Peking visit "the diplomatic coup of the century"; but the Japanese Premier Sato was dismayed. The visit has now finally been arranged to begin on the 21st of February which is just a little more than two weeks before the important primary in New Hampshire.

After the television broadcast (15 July) the President's party celebrated with a \$40 bottle of Chateau Lafite Rothschild (1961). The visit is in fact a triumph for China. Readers will remember the visit to Peking of Nkrumah from Ghana (if for no other reason then for its fatuous timing) and of Soekarno from Indonesia, and Ne Win of Burma, not to mention the recent visit of the Lion of Judah from Ethiopia. But never before has the head of a powerful state visited China.

## Preamble

Innocents abroad in the world of international politics may ask how Nixon, who began his career as a fervent anti-Communist, has brought himself to visit Mao Tse-tung. Did he not have a finger-waving session with Krushchev in the famous 'kitchen debate' in 1959. He did. Did he not urge the bombing of China in the Korean war? He did. Did not the Chinese leaders in 1970 call him "a cunning and crafty swindler and a murderer"? They did. "How come", these innocents may ask, "is he now going to drink scented jasmine tea with these same leaders, dine with Mao, and walk through the broad Gate of Heavenly Peace?"

In October 1967, before he became President, Nixon wrote an article in *Foreign Affairs* in which he said "Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China". And further "We simply cannot afford to leave China outside the family of nations". The visit was very carefully prepared. The French and the Canadians, and the Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, were all at one time or another used as intermediaries. In the summer of 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers urged the easing of tension in a number of speeches, and in 1970 for the first time China was called the "Peoples Republic of China" in a presidential document. In March last year came the invitation to the U.S. Ping Pong team, and in April the easing of trade barriers in non-strategic goods. Mao Tse-tung told the author, Edgar Snow, that Nixon would want to come to China some time after May for political reasons. Finally in 16 hours of talks (July 9-11) in Peking, Kissinger, adviser in national security — but elected by nobody, and responsible to nobody except the president — settled the matter with Chou En-lai. The visit was not mentioned at the time in the U.S. press. (Indeed the North Vietnamese leaders who read their American papers as diligently as some old age pensioners read theirs were astounded to hear of the visit when it was finally disclosed.)

Kissinger, by the way, was promptly called a 'Jewish Rasputin' by the radio in Minsk in a lengthy verbal 'portrait'.

### *As Seen by Chou En-lai*

Premier Chou En-lai now, after the alleged death of Lin Piao in a 'plane crash in Mongolia, second in power after Mao (third is Chiang Ching, Mao's wife) has been extremely blunt about Nixon's visit. In an interview with Julian Schuman (*International Herald Tribune*, 7 Oct.) he said:

"There are one million troops on our borders — army, air force, naval units in the coastal areas, nuclear weapons and guided weapons. . . . They (the Russians) have sent 300,000 troops into the People's Republic of Mongolia. . . . Nevertheless, our policy is to negotiate. . . . Even when Russian troops were massed on the borders, we still received Kosygin (9 Sept. 1969) at the Peking airport. . . . Not only have we not gone to Long Island, we have not gone to Honolulu. Even with the U.S. navy in the Taiwan Strait, we are for negotiations."

Fear of attack is a constant element in Chinese pre-occupations. (Those who read my articles in *Christian Order: The Sino-Soviet Clash*, May 1969, and *Sino-Soviet Crisis*, October 1970 will not be surprised to see me refer to this unending Sino-Soviet war crisis again.)

"If a war is launched against China", Chou En-lai continued, "what should we do? . . . Suppose the Soviet Army goes straight to the northern banks of the Yellow River, the Americans go to the southern banks of the Yangtze River, and Japan invades and occupies Singtao to Shanghai, and India joins in and invades Tibet. What would we do? We must dig tunnels underground, and this has been done in every

big and small city. . . . China has no soldiers abroad, no overflights of anyone's territory, and no naval forces on anyone's oceans or seas."

### *The New Policy*

China wants the status of a super-power. She is determined to legalise the Communist government of China and dispose of any rival claimants. Since October 1970 she has established diplomatic relations with 12 countries. With a seat on the U.N. and Taiwan voted out of that body (76 to 35 on the Albanian resolution) she has nearly achieved that objective. She is convinced that the U.S. decision to withdraw from Vietnam is irreversible.

Chou En-lai in his interview with James Reston of *The New York Times*, which lasted five hours (and during which they seemed to have eaten everything from quails' eggs to tangerine tarts), stated that China wanted a seat on the U.N., and that she would "continue to give the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese assistance to the end, until the complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces." Chou En-lai has frequently stressed to western correspondents the fear that China has of the ever growing power of Japan. If the U.S. withdraws its forces partially from Indochina, Korea and Taiwan, the Chinese are clearly afraid that the Japanese would move in to fill the vacuum. It is true that according to Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, drafted largely by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Japanese renounced the use of war as a means of settling disputes; and renounced also the possession of arms. But when the Americans were pulling out their forces to cope with the Korea situation they more or less forced the Japanese to build a self-defence force, which now numbers some 238,980 men. Japan could in fact become a nuclear power with the most frightening speed. It is surely not only the Chinese who should be alarmed at this prospect. (To be fair, in a recent survey 81% of the Japanese people were against altering Article 9.)



### *As Seen from the U.S.*

The aim of the Peking meeting as seen by President Nixon is "to seek to normalise relations between the two countries and exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides". One abiding question of concern to the U.S. is ending the war in Vietnam; another is the fate of the American prisoners of war. And it may be significant that when the meeting was first mentioned the North Vietnamese and the Koreans were seriously disturbed. It seems highly unlikely that in the preliminary talks between Chou and Henry Kissinger a potential settlement of the Vietnam war was not arrived at. Of course China could not force Hanoi to negotiate a face-saving settlement. But Kissinger may have assured Chou that the withdrawal of American troops would go on, and that they would not engage in any more combat missions. In return Chou may have agreed to press Hanoi towards a settlement short of a takeover of South Vietnam. (This will follow afterwards — however much it is deplored elsewhere in the world.) A new Geneva-style conference might be called in which China would play a leading role in the ending of the conflict.

### *Election '72*

You have only to look at a map of the world and fix the dates of various meetings to note that President Nixon is the man at the centre of all the recent and coming high-level talks. He met Pompidou (Dec. 13-14) in the Azores, Heath in Bermuda (on Dec. 20-21), Trudeau sometime in late December (on a date not fixed at the time of writing), Premier Sato in San Clemente (Jan. 6-7); the Chinese leaders will be met on 21st February, and the Soviet leaders in Moscow in May 1972. Not even a political genius could satisfy all these men that he will do the best for all of them. Nixon will try to give that impression. He will after the meeting with Pompidou and Heath speak for the west. There will be no attempt to play off one communist power against the other. Henry

Kissinger has already dismissed this as "two-bit Machiavelli".

What is it all in aid of? Is it a genuine attempt to create a decade of peace? Or is it a strong bid for a second term as President of the United States? (Of course the Chinese could pull the rug from under the president, as the Soviets did for Eisenhower after the U-2 episode. As already noted, Mao has said that Nixon's visit is for political reasons. Why should the Chinese play the Republican game?) However, the president will have it borne in on him presently that all the scented Jasmine tea in China will not wash out the figures of the unemployed. We can only pray that Nixon with the power of the United States presidency at his command will make a genuine bid for peace. In the meantime we have his opinion (reported in *Time*, 3 January, 1972) "I am confident that the United States right now is on the brink of exercising its power to do good in the world . . . Our aim is to build a structure of peace such as we could not dream of after World War II; we couldn't dream of this when Eisenhower was President. It wasn't the right time. It wasn't the right time when Kennedy was there. But now the time may have come, and we must seize the moment in our relationships with the superpowers.

We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had extended periods of peace is when there has been a balance of power . . . So I believe in a world in which the United States is powerful. I think it will be a safer world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, but all together creating an even balance."

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# The Scottish National Health Service

J. M. JACKSON

THE Government has recently announced plans for the 'reform' of the administration of the National Health Service in Scotland. Changes in administration in England may follow later, though it is possible that these changes will differ in at least one significant respect from those which are now proposed for Scotland. Readers in England may feel that these Scottish reforms are no great concern of theirs, particularly if any proposals for England are significantly different. This may be true, in one sense. The Scottish changes will certainly have no immediate impact on their lives. Indeed, the effects of the proposed changes may take a long time to make themselves felt, even in Scotland. Nevertheless, it is worth discussing the new plans, both because they are of direct concern to those of us who are living north of the border and because a major principle in regard to the administration of a state service is involved.

## *The Present Structure of the NHS*

Before one can understand the proposed changes in the structure of the National Health Service in Scotland it is necessary to know just how the service is administered at the present time. Control of the service rests with three groups of authorities: there are hospital services, executive council services and local authority services. The hospital services are administered by Regional Boards which in turn delegate responsibility for groups of hospitals to Boards of Management.\* Executive councils are responsible for

\* In England and Wales, to Hospital Management Committees.

the general practitioner, dental and ophthalmic services. Executive councils are appointed in all areas and GPs, dentists, and dispensing chemists and opticians are under contract to the local executive council. Finally, a number of services are provided by local authorities including maternity and child welfare clinics, the former duplicating to some extent the facilities available in hospitals or from GPs.

There have been some criticisms of this tripartite service. The GP may feel that he is far too isolated from the hospital service. He may feel that he loses contact with his patient who enters hospital. In so far as the proposals for new legislation involve the creation of a more unified system there will be a great deal of support for it. There will, if the legislation goes through without major change, be Area Boards for the control of all aspects of the National Health Service within its boundaries. These will be quite large areas, corresponding roughly to the large first tier local authorities that will be brought about by the reform of local government. Critics of the proposals would argue that the responsibilities of the Area Boards are too great. At the present time, a Regional Hospital Board will be at least as big as the proposed Area Board. Nevertheless, it will delegate responsibility for particular groups of hospitals to Boards of Management, each of which is likely to have as many members as the Regional Board itself. Other aspects of the health service within the Regional Board area will be the responsibility of the executive councils or local authorities. In other words, a very small number of part-time members of the Area Board (perhaps nine to twelve) will assume responsibilities that are at present shared by perhaps a hundred or more people (indeed perhaps a lot more than a hundred).

This, of course, is not conclusive proof that the new system will be unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, it is important that we should see exactly what the present responsibilities of a hospital Board of Management are and what may be

lost by the adoption of a single tier system of administration.\*

### *The Board of Management*

The present position is that the Board of Management is the final authority in the administration of the hospitals in the group. It is, of course, required to act within certain limits. Major development projects may have to be submitted to the Regional Board, and it must also conform to general rules laid down in certain matters by the Government. The Board members must naturally rely heavily on the advice given them by their senior officers. At Board meetings there will normally be in attendance the Group Secretary, the Medical Superintendent of the Group, the Group's Principal Nursing Officer, and if there is more than one hospital in the group the Secretary of each hospital may also be present. Nevertheless, the Board members will take an active interest in many aspects of the work of the hospitals, and those involved in such work are convinced that a great deal may be lost if Boards of this type disappear. Let us examine in a little more detail some of the contributions that may be made by the Board members.

First, it is usual for two members of the Board to visit the hospitals of the group in rotation. If there are three hospitals in the group, each will be visited by members of the Board on four occasions in the course of the year. Each member of the Board will probably make two such visits to different hospitals during the year. This in fact tends to be the *minimum* programme of visits. On these occasions, the Board members will be free to visit any part of the hospital they choose; and if a record is kept of the areas visited, it is likely that few parts will escape visitation during the year. There will be other visitors. An annual inspection will be made by members

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\* I choose to concentrate on this aspect of the situation because I can write with authority as a member of a Board of Management for a group of mental hospitals.



of the Regional Board, and some members of the Group Board of Management will accompany them. There may be visits by local MPs who will again be accompanied by Board members as well as senior officers. The result is that members of the Board will soon acquire quite a thorough knowledge of many aspects of the work of the hospitals under their control. They will have opportunities to see what needs to be done, to see if there is anything wrong with the way things are being done. It will be possible for members of the staff to approach Board members with complaints or suggestions. This will be particularly the case where informal social contacts between Board members and hospital staffs have been developed.

Of course, no administrative system is foolproof. There has been more than one serious case of patients being ill-treated in mental hospitals and there are many instances in England and Wales of such hospitals being grossly overcrowded. If, however, such things can happen when there is a Board of Management (or Management Committee) responsible for the Group, surely such things will be all the more likely to occur when management is in the hands of a remote Area Board whose members, because of their fewness and the breadth of their responsibilities, can have no intimate knowledge of particular hospitals.

### *Establishing Priorities*

No hospital is perfect. All concerned with administration in the hospital service are only too well aware that there is much that could be done if more money were available. In any hospital group the officers will have a number of projects that they would like to see implemented if the Board of Management can find the money. There is never enough money for all the developments that may be suggested, and this means that the officers or the Board will have to determine their priorities. In the case of the mental hospitals, one would normally expect that the officers would agree among themselves about the priorities and that the Board of Management would merely endorse their

decision. There could be occasions when the Board might have to decide between rival claims, but these should be rare.\*

The Board will have to decide, whether for itself or following the recommendation of its officers, which projects are possible within their budget. But this is not the end of the matter. The Board of Management does not just accept the funds allocated to it by the Regional Board. It will, on occasions, make representations to the Regional Board if it considers that the allocation of funds is inadequate and that serious defects in the services provided by its hospitals will result if the allocation is not increased. It might, for example, claim that additional funds were necessary to enable the nursing staff to be increased on the ground that the existing establishment did not provide adequately for the needs of the patients. Such protests are made, and sometimes they may be successful. It is particularly important that somebody should continue to exercise this role, at least in the case of the mental hospitals. In some parts of Britain, these have been the Cinderellas of the health service. This is a situation that can all too easily arise. Wards for older, chronic psychiatric patients or older mental defectives who might have few friends or relatives to visit them could easily be neglected in favour of other aspects of the hospital service that were more open to public view.

### *Can the Single Tier System Work?*

It may seem obvious that the functions exercised by the Board of Management will have to be exercised by somebody in the new set up. This is not quite true. In so far as the Boards of Management may exercise a 'watchdog' role, this will not be undertaken by anyone in

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\* I cannot speak here from experience but I would expect that the Board of Management for a general hospital group would have to arbitrate more frequently between rival claims. This is because the claims of the ophthalmologists would be quite distinct from those of the general surgeons or physicians. In the mental hospitals, on the other hand, there would be a single speciality, psychiatry, and ancillary services would be clearly related to the work of the psychiatrists.

the new structure of administration. There will, it must be admitted, be local advisory committees. These will have the right to visit and to receive information. In practice, however, they cannot have the same efficacy as a Board that has administrative authority. To start, a purely advisory body of this kind will not attract the high calibre of membership that may be willing to serve today on Boards of Management. The consumers councils attached to the various nationalised industries are not particularly noted for their success in protecting consumer interests, and there is no reason to suppose that advisory committees in the NHS would do any better. Of course, somebody will have to take the administrative decisions that are now made by Boards of Management. Will they do so more or less efficiently?

If one small board is to be responsible for the whole of the NHS administration in a large area, it will obviously have to limit its role to the determination of major issues of policy. Most of the decisions which are at present taken at the Board of Management level will now be taken by officers. We do not know exactly what administrative structures will evolve. There may well be a development on a much greater scale than at present of common services. In theory this might be advantageous. It might seem that a building or catering department might serve all hospitals in a certain area instead of a general and a mental hospital group being served by separate departments. But however attractive the idea of a large central department may appear in practice, whatever economies ought to be possible, there is the danger that it will get out of control. It goes its own way and neither Board of Management can call it to account. Costs may rise because of this lack of proper accountability. Where this may now happen on a small scale, it may in the future occur on a much larger scale.

How are priorities to be decided within a hospital or group of hospitals? Although agreement may be possible between the various interests within the hospital, occasions

may arise when the Board of Management will have to arbitrate. If there is no Board, who will then exercise this function? There is no officer who is the administrative head of the hospital. Hospital administration is in three parallel divisions, general, medical and nursing. The Group and Hospital Secretaries are responsible for finance and domestic staff, the Medical Superintendent is responsible for administrative matters relating to the medical staff and the Chief Nursing Officer for all nursing matters. Each of the senior officers is in full control of his own sphere, but they cannot function independently. At present the Board of Management is ultimately responsible for all decisions, and all three senior officers are responsible to it. What happens to unresolved conflicts of opinion when there is no one above the senior officers? No individual officer can be given full responsibility for the whole administration. A medical superintendent cannot be expected to exercise authority in non-medical matters, nor can he be expected to be responsible in medical matters to a lay administrator. There may be more senior officers in the Area Board office, but these too will be in one of the three divisions and unable to resolve the issue. Will all unresolved conflicts have to be taken to the Area Board?

### *Is Industry a Guide?*

It may be objected that industry and commerce manage perfectly well by delegating authority to managers. Where a big industrial group has subsidiary companies, each may have its own Board of Directors, but this will only take major decisions. The running of a factory or a sales office will normally be left to a manager who is appointed for the purpose. But we have seen already that there is an important difference in the hospital service, in so far as there are three separate areas of administration. In industry, the factory manager is in sole charge and it is his responsibility to produce the goods required on time and as cheaply as possible. He will have engineering and

personnel specialists to *advise* him but he alone decides, or leaves decisions to subordinates to whom he has delegated his authority. There is, however, a further important difference between hospital administration and industry. In industry there is a fairly simple test of efficiency. Goods have to be produced as cheaply as possible. If the factory manager is inefficient, costs will rise and the firm will be unable to sell its goods at a profit. If a sales office falls down on the job, it will be obvious that orders are not coming in and the factory will have to curtail production. But in the hospital service it is impossible to use a simple criterion like cost to measure efficiency. One wishes to keep costs down, certainly, but above all one wants a proper standard of service to patients. Perhaps in a general hospital a gross deterioration of standards would show itself in obvious ways but a lesser deterioration might be more difficult to detect except by those who have an intimate knowledge of the hospital. Again, the deterioration of the service provided by mental hospitals could take the form of a lower standard of life for the chronic patients who may never leave the hospital. The quality of life they enjoy matters, but it cannot be shown on any statistical return. There is a danger that in a field such as this a danger of undetected deterioration of the service exists if ultimate control is not in the hands of people who are in close contact with the hospitals for which they are responsible.

The officers at each hospital will still have to draw up their plans as they do at the moment. Priorities will have to be decided at some higher level, or if the priorities presented are accepted, the higher authority will have to draw the line between those projects which can go ahead and those which must be postponed. Perhaps the officers will present arguments for their case, but since they are dealing with officers who are senior to them they may be inhibited from further argument once a decision has been made. A Board of management whose members are in no way dependent upon the superior body is in a much



stronger position to continue pressing for what it believes to be necessary.

### *Conclusion*

I have tried to show that the proposal to place the whole responsibility for the running of the health service on a single Area Board is likely to have dangers for the maintenance of standards in the hospital service. Executive council services are much less likely to be affected, since the service the GP offers is much more dependent on the individual now, and if the patient is not satisfied he can readily change whereas he may have no alternative to the hospital service provided. Perhaps there has been too much division between the separate parts of the NHS but it remains to be seen whether the creation of a single controlling authority will solve all the problems of co-operation between GPs and hospitals, for example. Nor is there any reason to suppose that co-operation could not be developed within the present structure of administration.

It may be that there is no real alternative to a national health service at the present time. I think we must accept that. There are, however, grave dangers when an essential service like medical care is virtually a state monopoly. If, however, there is no practical alternative, there would seem to be a measure of protection for the public if the administration is shared by as many people as possible and these people are really able to know what is happening. To have a small board take all important planning decisions for a large area and to leave *all* lesser decisions entirely to the officers is to create a bureaucratic machine in which the interests of the patients will not receive the consideration they get at the moment.

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Is the problem of evil soluble this side of eternity? Is the use of torture ever justified? If priests are not to be active in politics, how can they implement the Church's social teaching?

## Any Questions?

WILLIAM LAWSON, S.J.

Is the problem of evil soluble this side of eternity?

It had to be solved, and has already been solved, this side of eternity, or we should have had no escape from evil here or hereafter. The evil of the world is disorder, the destruction by sin of the order established by God. He is the Creator. Man was made, and should have loved and served Him and brought an ordered universe to perfection. By sin he tried to make himself his own God, and in so doing he lost command of both himself and the lesser creation. Where there had been universal peace—"the tranquility of order", as St. Augustine defines it—there entered enemies, themselves the fruits, and now the propagators, of disorder: the devil, the world and the flesh. God alone could bring back order to His creation and He did it by the Incarnation. The work is accomplished. The essential obedience of man to God is performed by Christ, and Christ has taken over the government of the universe as its King. It now remains for human beings to accept Christ — He will not force them for they are free. In His own time He will put an end to human history, and evil will be confined, unable to range abroad.

All that truth we know by faith. In the light of faith we seek explanations, and those can't be more than gropings

in the darkness of mystery. We can give reasons for the sin of the angels, and for the sin at the origin of all human ills; but there remain endless questions with only partial answers. "Who can know the mind of God?" In the vision of God, His Providence will also be seen. We, if we come into His presence, shall have no more problems, not because we comprehend God but because we are filled with His love.

### Is the use of torture ever justified ?

Suppose you are in a plane high over the Atlantic, just beyond the point of no return. One of the passengers shouts out that he has hidden a bomb in the plane, and it is timed to explode in fifteen minutes and blow the plane in two. What do you do? Search the plane? There isn't time. Subject the man to intolerable pain so that he will spare himself by revealing the hiding-place? That is torture. So you sit out the fifteen minutes waiting for death.

How do you treat an arrested member of a criminal gang which has already murdered and is planning more murders? He has forfeited his ordinary human right to liberty. Has he lost also the right to physical integrity, so that, to make him divulge information which will enable you to save innocent life, you may justly beat him up?

Anyone possessed of guilty knowledge before or after a crime is more or less closely involved in the crime itself, and his punishment by law can be morally justifiable. Not to pass on that knowledge to the guardians of the peace is to be "mute of malice". Are the officers of the law justified in inflicting pain to overcome malicious dumbness?

Our decent instincts are revolted by the use of torture. It degrades the sufferer and the one who inflicts it. It is the weapon of tyranny. It is self-propagating: once it has been adopted it becomes the method of choice for interrogation. It strikes the innocent as well as the guilty. It produces confessions and incriminations which are untrustworthy. In crude and subtle forms it has been and

still is used in police states like those under Communist rule; and civilization is aghast.

Meanwhile, your plane is coming down towards the Atlantic. You have five minutes left.

**If priests are not to be active in politics, how can they implement the Church's social teaching?**

I should say, to begin with, that the implementing of the Church's social teaching is not the business of priests at all, except in the very specialized field of education. Their duties, for which they are ordained, are to offer the Sacrifice of the Mass, in the name and in the place of Christ, to administer the sacraments, to preach the word of God, to pray the liturgical prayer in union with the whole Church, and to be men of prayer all the time.

Part of their teaching — and it is more and more important these days — is of the Church's social doctrines, which are set out in the social encyclicals and in authentic commentaries on those documents. In schools, from the pulpit, and in other teaching relationships, priests should make known the rights of man, and in particular the obligation we all have towards the needy. The works of mercy need to be taught, and priests above all should teach them — as the express doctrine of Christ or as "social justice"; but if they perform that, and their other duties, properly, they will have no time — nor have they the training — to carry out selected works of mercy themselves, other than that of instructing the ignorant. They should keep to a sensible division of labour and not try to do the layman's job for him.

As for politics, in so-called democratic countries they are the arena for party struggles, with ambitions and rivalries affecting the voters as well as their representatives. A priest should not in even a minor way compromise the Church by being identified with one party. He should not stand for politics but for principles.

## Is there something wrong with a Christian who is always in fear of death ?

Doesn't that depend on the kind of fear he undergoes, and the degree of it? There is a saying that we do not become genuinely adult until we know that we, personally, are going to die. Death is certainly an event in everybody's experience, but for a long time, in the human mind, it is something that happens to everybody else but not to "me". That unrealism has to disappear before we can be considered mature. Once we have faced reality, how can we not be afraid? Death is an experience that has to be gone through alone; and beyond it is the unknown of eternity. For the Christian the loneliness is the company of Christ, and eternity is the loving presence of God; but faith is knowledge in the depth and darkness of mystery, and fear in darkness is prudent. It is all very well to say that so long as we are alive there is no death and that after the moment of death we are consciously alive again. The moment has to be faced for a long time; and we are in doubt of the kind of life into which we shall emerge from the tunnel of death. To be unafraid is folly.

To be obsessed with the thought of death is unhealthy. We are supposed to keep death in mind so that we may live well and enjoy life. Death of the kind which is to be ours is the result of sin. The moral and permanent evil in the act of dying has been removed by Christ who carried our sins and took the sting out of death by rising from it. When we think of death we should remember the death and resurrection of Christ.

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# Book Reviews

## SOVIET DOUBLE-CROSS IN LATIN AMERICA

**Guerillas in Latin America** by Alphonse Max; Interdoc (Van Stolkweg 10, The Hague, Holland), pp. 100; no price stated.

It is a pity that the author of this hundred-page booklet tends to overwrite himself for, in it, he has some very valuable things to say. His tendency is to run them into the ground, thereby taking from the authority that a less overwrought style would lend to his writing. Neither is he helped by his translator, who gives the impression of a Dutchman rendering Spanish over-literally into English. The effect is tiresome and tends to set one against the other from the start. All of which is most unfortunate, for there can be no doubt but that Alphonse Max knows his subject and that his booklet is, in itself, a very valuable contribution to a closer understanding of it. Despite its defects of presentation and style it deserves closer attention.

This applies particularly to what he has to say in general concerning the Latin - American Guerilla Left. Contrary to what so many have been brought to believe he insists — quite rightly in my opinion — that the Left in Latin America — guerilla or otherwise and fed in either capacity by Communism of one brand or another — is *not* a popular movement with its origins at grass-roots level and led by the victims of social injustice. On the contrary, it is led by and largely composed of young, yet frustrated and psychologically disturbed members of Latin America's ruling and upper class. In other words, the drive behind those who are thought of today as Latin America's revolutionary youth is psychological rather than sociological. They have taken to revolution as their North American

counterparts have taken to campus riots, basically by way of compensation for the frustrations forced on them by the prolonged, pre-adult existence thrust on them by the demands of contemporary higher education. For Latin America's bourgeois youth, the excitement of revolutionary society offers solace for the feelings of alienation engendered by the extended pre-adulthood of prolonged university education, as well as opportunity for postponing indefinitely the responsibilities that maturity demands. The parallel in North America and Western Europe is found in the underground society of the young, with its own sub-culture characterised by the repudiation of authority and the enthronement of pointless spontaneity as its chosen and essential dynamic. This latter expresses itself from time to time — and always pointlessly — in violence against contemporary society, either physically or in the form of moral and artistic shock. The basic motivations which drive bourgeois, pre-adult youth are the same in Latin America on the one hand and the United States and Western Europe on the other. They differ only in manner of expression.

As the author writes in, I am afraid, execrable English: "Whereas working youth has obtained a certain degree of personal independence and responsibility owing to its normal everyday occupation and its striving for professional perfection, thus constituting a veritable support of Marcuse's derided 'establishment' the academic youth of Latin America is fully taken up with its studies, which can only be pursued with the help of parents and State. The spiritual phenomenon of an artificially prolonged puberty, coupled with almost total financial dependence on State and family, results in a release from responsibility of every kind. This retardation - creating factor in the students' personality and their temporary elimination as active, useful and productive members of society is the breeding-ground for the social neurosis which they try to offset by sacrificing family, State, Church and

university to their puberty-conditioned iconoclastic needs. . . . .

"Inexplicably, both State and family seem to be completely at a loss as to how to deal with this hybris within the student element. The only likely explanation for this is that the students are the sons of sustainers of the "Establishment" who instinctively reject the use of force against their own offspring. If it were the workers who indulged in rebellion against the State and public order, the authorities would feel no compunction in calling the brawling elements to order. But as they are dealing with their own flesh and blood, they are inclined not to take the rebels very seriously: after all, 'we were all young once' and then there is also the deference in which they hold the future academicians of the country. In a word, the authorities refuse to deal with these hooligans in the proper manner and to set in motion the mechanisms of state power that exist precisely for such a contingency. Hence the distorted picture of a helpless society, able to defend itself against everything except its own weakness."

There may be a tendency to over-simplify here, but, at root, I think Alphonse Max is right. And the Communists, of course, take advantage of these frustrations of Latin American university youth, working as they always do on existing contradictions, with an eye to their own advantage. Before considering this aspect of Latin America's revolutionary situation, it is well worth while pausing for a moment to study further the implications of the author's point, which has been considered already in this review-article. What it comes to surely, is this: if the basic causes of Latin America's bourgeois-led revolution are psychological rather than social, it would seem to follow that the revolution itself will not be checked by the firm application of social-justice programmes to all Latin American countries. One is not saying for a moment that such programmes should not go ahead, though the

feverishness behind some of them at present — especially in Church circles — should be cooled down in favour of a more thoughtful approach to the problems presented by social injustice. But the problem, really, is one of direction and emphasis and the manner of its solution is fraught with significant consequences, not only for the Church in Latin America but throughout the Third World. At the moment, she is throwing a great part of her resources — not always very intelligently, if I may say so with respect — into the struggle for social justice in the developing countries. Motives here are several; positive, if you like, and negative. Amongst the latter is the thought that the Communist Revolution can only be withstood by positive action in the interests of social justice. This rests on the assumption that Communism breeds in poverty, that the leaders of its revolution in the Third World are drawn, in consequence, from the poor. But, if this is not wholly so; if the breeding ground of revolution is not mainly the slum, but the campus, then, if the Church wants to win the battle against Communism in the Third World, a realignment of resources in the shape of money and men would seem to be called for. And what may well be needed is a redressing of the present balance — away, that is, from what could be present over-emphasis on the fulfilment of the material needs of the poor and in the direction of the education in Catholic truth of the young bourgeoisie of the Third World, who are at present in receipt of too little attention and, therefore, too little by way of resources of money and men.

If this analysis is correct, then the proposed withdrawal of the Mexican Jesuits, for example, from the education of that country's upper-class youth at school-level in Mexico City could well prove to be a serious mistake; liable, indeed, to leave the door open to frustration and the conversion into rootless revolutionaries of those whom the first-class teaching of religion would have turned not into pillars of an outworn establishment, but real leaders of their country. The same would seem to go for Catholic

education everywhere. At the very time when it would appear to be most needed by way of counter to the agnostic secularism of contemporary university teaching, religious orders are abandoning it and allowing their members to seek fulfilment in what the Americans call the "inner city". What this means, in fact, is that the younger ones — and too many of the older in a kind of naive, second childhood — attach themselves to the prevailing, pre-adult sub-culture of the young, which they are brash enough to mistake for reality and on which, in fact, they have minimal effect. Daniel Berrigan, I think, is a case in point.

For a very long time, I am afraid, the Catholic Faith, has been one of the worst taught subjects in Catholic schools and all too little attention has been paid to the needs of young Catholics at university level in this regard. Yet the need for remedial action in this field has been apparent to a few for a very long time. Now, with the growth of independence of the Third World, it is more necessary than ever. It is all the more tragic that, at this point in time, when the need is so vital and the opportunity presented by prevailing circumstances so great, the teaching orders of the Church should appear increasingly ready — anxious even — to withdraw from the educational field in the interests of a somewhat vague, inter-denominational pursuit of social justice on the assumption that, otherwise, the poor will rise up against the Church. In this, I believe, contemporary thinking within the Church may prove badly mistaken; the new over-emphasis on meeting the needs of what is called social justice may have an effect exactly the opposite of that intended. My plea here is for a thoughtful reconsideration of the whole question — essentially one of proportion — before it is too late.

I have allowed myself to be diverted. I have done so deliberately because I think the point made above is of capital importance. If, through faulty analysis of the present situation — driven to it, perhaps, by the pressure



of younger clerics and religious, themselves the product of the prevailing pre-adult culture of the student world — the Church diverts her resources down wrong channels through over-concentration on the apparent claims of social justice; if this proves the case, history may well show that the Church has sown dragon's teeth, aiding and abetting all unwittingly the very revolution she hoped to forestall. Under such circumstances, Communism alone will prove the ultimate winner and the only thing the poor will have to their credit when the business is over will be an exchange of servitudes.

Meanwhile, Soviet Communism — as distinct from the brands of Marxism favoured by the revolutionary student groups — is pursuing a not unfamiliar path in Latin America. The tragedy is that the path remains unrecognised by so many, not least the young clerics who have taken to themselves the frustrations and revolutionary ardour of the student world. The Soviet objective in South America is the penetration of the continent and the means sought are those which are economic and political and outwardly respectable, with the economic used as a means to further the political, which itself rests on a base of peaceful co-existence. Respectability is adopted as the appropriate Soviet pose at surface level: underneath it, well-drilled Communist cadres, allied to Moscow and *not* to the Guerilla Left, are using the training of decades to engage in skilful industrial action and sabotage with a view to increasing the economic dependence of South America on the Soviet Union and thereby making much easier its political penetration. At the same time, in quietly unobtrusive yet relentless fashion, Moscow is tightening its financial grip on intellectuals, writers and artists, Press and communications media in Latin America in order that these may be turned steadily into so many vehicles of propaganda for the furtherance of a glorified Marxist dream: in this she is succeeding. And it is to this dream, furthered by their own intellectuals in the financial grip of indigenous Communist Parties subservient to Moscow — that the

frustrated student youth of Latin America turns in revolutionary fervour. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and its representatives maintain an attitude of friendly correctness with the countries concerned. The brash young revolutionaries are none of their children: the heroes of these are Mao and Che Guevara and Camilo Torres. Nevertheless, the young revolutionaries work without knowing it to the ultimate advantage of the Soviet Union and this, really, is the tragic irony of it all. Alphonse Max is so good on this point that he deserves quotation at some length:

“On examining Moscow’s outward reaction to the guerilla movement in Latin America, one finds an expectant attitude. The Soviets are conscious of the fact that an irrationally conditioned political action which aims at an immediate take-over of the power of State must sooner or later end in fiasco. When the time comes for the guerillas to quit the scene, Moscow will appear on the stage and will cash in on the situation. This is the tragedy of the Latin American guerilla movement: those powers, with which it does not identify itself, will finally skim off the cream, because they have the better nerves. In their objective effect, the partisans, although unconscious of the fact, are therefore simply tools of the Soviet Union. The guerillas are manipulated by Castro; Castro is helplessly dependent on Moscow. Consequently, the guerillas are merely pawns on Moscow’s chess-board. The Soviet Union cannot permit the emergence of a third competitive power centre. The attempt by the Soviet Union to establish or increase economic relations with the Latin American countries, as well as her use of the coexistence doctrine as a foreign policy varnish of the Soviet state philosophy, compel the Russians at times to disavow Castro and his regime, at least unofficially, and from time to time even officially.

Indicative of the Kremlin’s attitude in Latin

America is the fact that it has recently established more extensive conventional (diplomatic, economic, cultural, sports and so-called parliamentary) relations. At the same time, Castro is plainly dependent on Moscow; this means that Soviet policy in relation to Latin America moves along two outwardly contradictory lines : on the one hand, the Soviet Government maintains relations, which can be regarded as normal, with the governments of the different countries, while on the other hand it supports, by remote control through Cuba, guerilla operations against these same governments.

"From the Kremlin's viewpoint this makes sense. At the so-called Tricontinental Conference held in Havana in 1966, Cuba undertook to lead the entire guerilla activity in Latin America, to finance it and to provide support for it. The fact that Che Guevara, a member of the Cuban Government holding the rank of Minister, was personally involved in the partisan activities proves that Cuba was fulfilling its promise. The present regime in Cuba (it cannot be repeated often enough) is more than any other satellite cable-bound to Moscow. On the other hand, Moscow is obliged to appear as if she is keeping aloof, owing to the danger of international complications which might arise out of Cuba's intervention in the internal affairs of other Latin American States. Such extra-national activity, if conducted by the Cuban Government without Moscow's firm control, could lead to consequences unfavourable to the USSR, as happened in 1962.

Nevertheless, Moscow cannot afford to renounce all interest in guerilla activity on a continent so disturbed as Latin America, even though standing aloof officially. The image of the USSR — although somewhat tarnished of late owing to Chinese counter-propaganda — is that of a revolutionary State. The Soviet Union must consequently support all focuses

of revolution, even if she does not do so openly. As it is known that Cuba promotes the guerillas, the inference is clear that she does so under orders, or at least with permission, from Moscow. The fact that the Soviet Union is not openly involved allows the Kremlin to spare its own cadres, with the additional advantage that rivalling leftist forces, which are not bound by Communist Party discipline, wear themselves out in the senseless struggle against the authority of the various countries concerned.

"With this tactic the Soviet Union secures three advantages. First, the Latin American Left is assured that the Soviet Union is doing all possible for the guerillas, for she has indeed taken all the necessary steps, through the agency of her protégé, the Cuban Government. Second, Moscow makes certain that the Latin American governments remain under the impression that the Soviet policy is that of non-intervention, as indeed members of the pro-Russian Communist Parties only exceptionally take an active part in the guerilla movements. Third, by inciting these groups of the leftist sector of the population, which might in future compete with the pro-Russian Communist Parties, to fight against the governments, the Kremlin is able to eradicate the ultra-Left radical forces which it fears may one day become a real menace to the Communist Parties within the Latin American Left. Thus, while the radical Left is being wiped out, the pro-Moscow Left remains intact and ready for action at the precise moment when the cold, calculating mind of the Russian tacticians considers the time to be fitting."

This long passage is illuminating not only for what it reveals of Soviet strategy in South America, but because of its realization that similar methods are used elsewhere. Churchmen must study these methods: failure to do so could be disastrous.

Paul Crane, S.J.



**Celebration of Awareness** by Ivan D. Illich; Calder Boyers, £2.25; pp. 189.

A rather silly sentence on the Author appears at the end of the puff, which is printed on the back cover of his book: "In 1963 he was subjected to a near Inquisition at the Vatican which resulted in his renouncing his priesthood". I remember the incident. Reading about it at a fair distance from the scene, it did not seem like that to me at all. The impression received was of an intellectual craving martyrdom; which is precisely what Mgr. Ivan Illich, as he then was, proceeded to get. I should imagine that he had decided on laicization before the Roman incident.

Submission appears never to have come easily to him. He was dismissed by ecclesiastical authority from his post as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico because of the active part he played in the controversy over the Island's birth-control programme. In the introduction to one of the twelve essays contained in the present volume, Illich refers to *Humanae Vitae* as "the notorious papal encyclical on birth control" and goes on to describe it as "a document written in dead, juridicial language . . . but one which lacks courage, is in bad taste and takes the initiative away from Rome in the attempt to lead modern men in Christian humanism". The arrogance here is marked. It crystallises unpleasantly in his comment on the above. "This is sad", he writes. The Pope is to be pitied, in other words, for not agreeing with Ivan D. Illich. There is no thought, in fact, that the boot might be on the other foot. He appears utterly convinced of the near-infallibility of his own position not only on this matter of birth-control, but on others of which he treats — at times, indeed, with very considerable brilliance — in the pages of his book. Given this mentality, I do not see how he could have stayed in the priesthood. What staggers me most about his essays — almost all of which were written before his laicization — is the apparent



sence of any sense of the supernatural in any of them. They could just as well have been written by a highly intelligent agnostic, very much at home in the godless intellectual fringe of contemporary western society. Yet they were, in fact, written by a priest. I find this depressing. The author shows himself all too familiar with the secular nature of these essays written by a priest, which have, in fact, nothing of the priest in them. Somehow this oppresses and seems to take from their authenticity. The message strikes one as too intellectually slick to be true.

This, I say, is the impression; the hangover one experiences after going through the book. Yet, there is no denying its power; neither can there be any denial of the brilliance of thought that lies behind part of its writing. It is immensely incisive at times. I write this without any reluctance at all. My present feeling is simply one of sadness that a talent so rich could not have been reserved for work within the framework of the Catholic Church. In the event, it could not be for, so far as I can see, it remained untempered by any depth of spiritual vision. In the end, it was not the Church that discarded Ivan Illich; it was Ivan Illich who discarded the Church.

That said — and it is important that it should be said — let me say that this book is worth buying for its seventh chapter alone. Entitled, "Planned Poverty: the End-Result of Technical Assistance", it is a brilliant debunking of contemporary views on the planned development of the Third World that deserves the widest possible circulation and study. The same applies to everything Illich has to say with regard to the current export of what might be called western schooling to the developing countries by way of substitution for the true education they really need and must have if true progress is to be theirs. In all he says here Illich needs to be not merely read, but studied most closely. The compactness of his style demands this: so, too, does the originality of what he has to suggest and the refreshing independence of thought which lies behind all he has to say in this regard.

One must remember, of course, that Illich writes mainly within a Latin American context and that his view of the deleterious effects of foreign aid may well have been formed by contact with too much of it in predominantly American form. Acquaintance at first hand with Africa's experience in this regard might cause Illich to modify some of his opinions here. Nevertheless, I am very sure that the thesis he expounds so brilliantly is substantially correct and that the Church would do well in her aid-programmes to take most careful note of what he has to say.

This does not apply to his remarks on the population problem which are, in my opinion, amateur as well as theologically unsound. Neither do I give anything for his prognostications, in a chapter entitled "The Vanishing Clergymen", with regard to the future of the Catholic priesthood and the future structure of the Church as a whole. Here, I would say, Illich is at his amateur and somewhat amateur worst. There is far too much of himself in what he writes and, as I have written earlier, an absence of the spiritual in his approach to Church problems which lends small credence to anything he has to say about them. Slickness in this particular field is still less of a substitute for true depth of insight than it is in that of secular exploration. Above all, to be really fruitful, any examination of the Church's problems must be prayerful. The tone of Illich's writing would appear to indicate that for a considerable time now he has not been easily capable of it.

Paul Crane, S.J.